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2 1 Conceptualization
Abstract
It is a great honour for me to attend this conference and to address you on some
aspects of Identity, Identity Management and Law in the Information Society. As
I am a professor of Law and Information Technology in the Netherlands, at Leiden
University, I must begin by confessing that I know next to nothing about Turkish
law, and, consequently, even less about Turkish banking law. Consequently, my
contribution cannot be an essay in traditional legal scholarship, as traditional legal
scholarship is related to the interpretation and understanding of contingent legal
arrangements in contingent legal systems. It is rather an attempt in looking at and
understanding law as an inescapable, natural phenomenon in any social system
that needs organization - also in our worlds, as they are rapidly being invaded
by Internet and as they are increasingly dependent on it. It is my plan to start
with a few definitions, and a few examples, illustrating the problematic nature
of ‘Identity’ and ‘Identity Management’ in the Information Society. Thereafter I
will focus on a few legal intuitions concerning Identity Management, Internet and
Internet banking. There will be a few conclusions. Finally, by way of an appendix,
the approach chosen is accounted for.
1 Conceptualization
1.1 The identity of the Information Society
Let me begin by looking at the context, by looking at the positions of our
legal systems in the information society.
In 1948, sixty years ago, the Manchester Mark II, the first operational
general computing device, entered into this world. In 1958, the chairman of
IBM, Tom Watson, is quoted to have said that he thought that the world
market for computers to be no more than five. At that time, IBM was on
its way to become the first power player of the computing industry, In the
1970s, Codd’s logic for relational databases spread over the world, supporting
reliable administrative computing. In the same era, TCP/IP, the communi-
cation protocol of the Internet was developed by Kahn and Cerf and some
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1.1 The identity of the Information Society 3
basic netwerk services, like file transfer and email, became applicable. In
the 1980s, personal computing got introduced and word processing became
the first ‘killer application’ of the computing industry, that saw software
(Microsoft) take the lead over hardware (IBM).
In the 1990s we see Internet network services emerge that really take off
after the year 2000. Google, file sharing, internet banking, Wikipedia, Hyves,
Youtube, Second Life - none of these is more than 10 years of age.
It would be astonishing indeed if today, 9 January 2008, these innovations
would be at an end. We are taking part in a society that we may call ‘the
Information Society’ but that we must expect to be only at the very beginning
of its development. My first proposition is this:
(1) The ‘identity’ of the ‘Information Society’ is not yet formed.
Thus, I consider a phrase like ‘the identity of the information society’ a
contradiction in terms for practical purposes. This indicates that there are
some serious issues at stake when we think about law in the information
society. If we want to reap the fruits Internet offers, we need our aptness at
recognizing what means what, and what is what, in and outside Internet as
best as we can.
To illustrate the issue I have printed a snapshot of my 15-months-old grand-
son reacting to a TeleTubbie television show, seeing it for the first time in
his life. He liked it. He wished to take part in it and apparently assumed
this might be realized by climbing into the television set.
I think that the problems many foresee concerning our ability to distin-
guish between fact and fiction in the information society may be illustrated
by this snapshot. I am confident, however, that my grandson will learn to
appreciate the differences between a television show, a picture show, a stage
play, a news show, a computer game and many other virtual services. And,
like my grandson, we will undoubtedly learn to apprehend (i) the differences
between Internet-mediated services and real life as well as (ii) the separate
uses of Internet-mediated services in real life.
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4 1 Conceptualization
Fig. 1: Joining the Tubbies
In order to learn what the information society actually represents, we,
like my grandson, will have to bump our noses, experiment and be creative.
From this perspective Internet is part of real life, just like theatres, like foot-
ball stadiums, like gambling halls, like literature, like banks, like computer
programs, like schools, like presidential PR men, like legal Acts and like es-
says are. It helps, I think, to see the information society as a collection of
institutional services. I suggest the following definition:
(2) The information society is the space where our institutional services live,
of which more and more get Internet-mediated.
Again, this is a definition of a moving target. It does not provide identity, as
an important aspect of ‘identity’ is understood to be a quality of ‘sameness.’
And, as I just stipulated, our information society is not going to have much
‘sameness’ in the coming years. Consequently, our information society is a
contingent phenomenon and does not (yet) have identity (or only for very
short periods of time).
Yet, the definition does, at a higher level of abstraction, allow for identity:
in its structure. At the moment, I think that the most fruitful mechanism
i
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1.1 The identity of the Information Society 5
to understand phenomena in the information society is to iterpret them as
social services and to employ some analysis of what goes on there in terms
of IT-mediated, institutionalized games.1 These institutional games all have
a playing field (a jurisdiction), players, collective interests, collective beliefs,
rules, elites (umpires, legislators), props, publics, room for input from the
players and feedback mechanisms. And if an institutional game gets complex,
it may organize itself in hierarchical clusters of sub-games. My claim is
that any social phenomenon - even this conference! - can be described in
these terms and that anything that can be describe in these terms is an
institutional game. Thus, my propoosition is that institutional games and
social phenomena have the same structure (or abstract identity).
(3) Social phenomena (law systems also) have, being institutional games,
structural identity.
I consider this of importance, as we may use this structure as an analytical
tool when legally facing the new social phenomena of our information society
as they develop together with our law systems.
It is also important, where it suggests that material law, as a set of
valid rules, is an inescapable part of social phenomena, that material laws
are not impartial or independent ‘outside things.’ Thus, material law is an
inescapable part of social phenomena like Internet payments, Wikipedia com-
munity member commitment, the Radiohead price-discriminatory approach,
the RIAA-copyright enforcement efforts, file-sharing copyright infringement,
telecom data retention policies, SPAM, government data warehouding and
the services mentioned earlier. Consequently, as these services change laws
may change with them, just like when laws change these services may change
with them.
1 Somehow, games (as in game theory: Johan van Benthem, Cognition as interaction.
in: Gerlof Bouma, Irene Krämer and Joost Zwarts, editors, Cognitive Foundations of In-
terpretation. Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences, 2007), language games
(as in philosophy: Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations. Blackwell, 1953),
conceptual models (as in computer science: R.J. Wieringa, Requirements Engineering:
Frameworks for Understanding. Wiley, 1997) and institutions (as in economy: Avner Greif,
Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy: Lessons from Medieval Trade. Cam-
bridge University Press, 2006) seem to have serious family likeness and are able to provide
similar generic frameworks for understanding of social phenomena as moving targets.
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6 1 Conceptualization
Yes, if law systems are social phenomena themselves, they are themselves
institutionalized services. My suggstion is, that their ideal structure is nat-
ural. That it makes sense, from this perspective, to think about healthy
and unhealthy law systems, as material laws may corrupt the ideal natural
structure of law systems. And that it may make sense, from this perspective,
to take the issue into account when legally facing new phenomena in our
soicieties.2 One basic issue stands out here: security in institutional services
is largely provided by member (or participant) commitment.
1.2 Law principles
Identity of structure by no means implies identity of content. For legal sys-
tems this is, empirically, a no-brainer. Dutch law systems are different from
Turkish law systems, and Chinese law systems are - so I assume - different
from Mogadishu law systems.3 The languages of law systems are many, and
a unified body of knowledge about all different law systems in the world is
not available.4 Translation is next to impossible. If I would translate the
Dutch legal concept of ‘onrechtmatige daad’ in English, either literally (into:
‘unlawful act’) or to its conceptual next neightbour (into: ‘tort’) - in both
cases I would generate confusion. Translation of local legal concepts requires
extensive circumscription. To overcome some of these problems, we may look
2 It makes sense - for instance when facing regulatory problems in Second Life - to
remember Coase (Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm. Economica, 4 November
1937:16), Douglas (Mary Douglas, Purity and Danger: an Analysis of the Concept of Pol-
lution and Taboo. Routledge (Classics 2002), 1966), Williamson (Oliver E. Williamson,
The Economics of Governance. American Economic Review, 95 2005:2), Olson (Mancur
Olson, Power and Prosperity: Outgrowing communist and capitalist dictatorships. Ba-
sic Books, 2000), Frey (Bruno S. Frey, Not Just For the Money: an Economic Theory
of Motivation. Keagan Paul, 1997), Fuller (Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law, revised
edition. Yale University Press, 1967), Ellickson (Robert Ellickson, Order without Law:
How Neighbors Settle Disputes. Harvard University Press, 1991) and Montesquieu (Jean-
Louis de Secondat (Montesquieu), De l’Esprit des Lois. Constitution Society, 1748 〈URL:
http://www.constitution.org/cm/sol.htm〉). My notion of ‘natural law’ is derived
from their work.
3 Legal systems (as related to nation states) are law systems, but not all law systems
(as related to institutional services) are legal systems.
4 Thomas S. Ulen, A Nobel Prize in Legal Science: Theory, Empirical Work, and the
Scientific Method in the Study of Law. University of Illinois College of Law Review 2002:4
i
i
“Ankara” — 2008/1/11 — 17:02 — page 7 — #7 i
i
i
i
i
i
1.3 Problems with identity 7
at what we call ‘principles,’ material-law cocnepts of a very general nature
and often widely accepted, also internationally. As I need a few of them
later, I mention them here: the freedom (not) to transact is one, pacta sunt
servanda is another, as is ‘privity of contract,’ the principle that requires that
private dealings between parties do not to have legal consequences for whom
do not take part in the contract. Some5 stipulate that as soon as we step
over the privity-of-contract line, we are leaving the area of private law and
enter the realm of administrative law, where completely different principles
apply. Competition laws, Intellectual property laws, Consumer protection
laws, Privacy laws, Insurance laws and Banking laws are both borderline
and trans-border cases in this respect.
1.3 Problems with identity
Let me, against this background, turn to the concepts of identity and identity
management. These two concepts are changing rapidly under the influence
of new services in the information society.6 Let us look at a few examples
and just pose a few question.
A glass of water. Has a glass of water identity? I think so - as long as it is left
alone. However, water evaporates. How much has to evaporate, before
it has lost its identity? And, if I add a vitamin tablet to the glass of
water, does it lose its identity? What if I take a tiny nip? What if I
throw the water back in the decanter and immediately refill it from the
same decanter: does it lose and regain identical identity? What these
questions show is that:
(4) Objects have internal identity.
5 E. g., Ernest J. Weinrib, The Idea of Private Law. Harvard University Press, 1995
6 Much has been written about the subject. Let me mention just two interesting exam-
ples: Bert-Jaap Koops and Ronald Leenes, ID THeft, ID Fraud and/or ID-related Crime:
Definitions Matter. Datenschutz und Datensicherheit, 2006:9 and Beth Simone Noveck,
Trademark Law and the Social Construction of Trust: Creating the Legal Framework for
Online Identity. Washington University Law Quarterly, 83 2005, and the webside with
publications of the FIDIS-project (on the future of Identity in the Information Society):
http://www.fidis.net/publications.
i
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8 1 Conceptualization
Traditionally, the identity of a thing is in the thing itself - the identity of
an object is internal to it. When Internet is brought into play, and we are
visiting a website to buy an object, the internal identity of the object cannot
be investigated directly. To overcome this problem, in the information society
we get to inspect the description of the thing in stead of the thing itself.
This description is its external identity. External identities are of paramount
importance to the legal issues related to reputation, proof (evidence) and
trust. On Internet, we often have to make do with whatever external identity
of an object is available. Thus:
(5) Objects have internal and external identities
Here is, where the trouble with identities starts. That is, whenever internal
and external identities diverge in a transaction. In banking, a well-known and
extreme problem of this kind is presented by counterfeit money. Counterfeit
- in this sense - has the external identity of an object (in casu: monetary
value) that simply isn’t there. And, allowing for the platitude that the whole
concept of cash rests on an assumption of trust, we will get into real trouble
as soon as banks, or automated teller machines, would start turning out
counterfeit. My next propositon is that
(6) Identity problems arise from internal-external identity anomalies
And, of course, the same goes for persons. Persons too do have internal and
external identities. And again, the trouble starts as soon as internal and
external identities diverge. In banking, the trouble of credit-card forgery is
an apt example. Then, an external identity is stolen and related to a false
internal identity.
And, again, the same goes for ‘groups’ or ‘communities.’ It is a public
secret that some banks use zipcodes in their deliberations on credit. Then,
a zipcode is used as part of the external identity of a group, that is applied
to one of its members.
i
i
“Ankara” — 2008/1/11 — 17:02 — page 9 — #9 i
i
i
i
i
i
9
There are big differences between the internal and the external identities of
things and persons. Internal identities cannot be objectified - they are already
objectified, they exist only in the original; external identities, however, can.7
(7) external identities can be objectified themselves and thus can be managed
Consequently, external identities may have value - reputations are external
itdentities - they can be sold, bought, forged and managed. (Generally, we
mean external-identity management when we use the term ‘identity manage-
ment’). As identity management is becoming very important in our informa-
tion society, we may expect it to become an important and interesting new
industry.
2 A few examples
Let me, before I try to present a taxonomy of anomalies betweeen internal
and external identities (and relate them to the law in the most abstract
manner) show you a few other examples:
A family from Iran in- and out of the Netherlands. My first example concerns
contingent Dutch Asylum law. On November 11, 2005, the Dutch
Supreme Court has ruled null and void a Ministerial Decree of Novem-
ber 6, 1997, which awarded Dutch citizenship to an Iraqui family of
five: two parents and three children. What had happened? The Iraquis
had, on entrance into the Netherlands in 1992, provided incorrect birth
dates, (which they corrected two months later). The Ministerial Decree
carried the wrong dates. Somehow - presumably through governmen-
tal data warehouding - the anomaly between the Decree and the Iraqui
passports was brought to the attention of the government agency in-
volved. The Minister reasoned as follows: as the Iraquis were not born
7 The distinction between internal and external identity can get very complex: in IT-
lore, we might consider meta-data to represent (parts of) the external identity of the data
concerned. Thus: data (as a description of something) gain identity by being objectified
and can get external identity themselves. Nevertheless, in ICT, data are always also
external to the things they describe.
i
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10 2 A few examples
on the dates of the Decree, the Decree did not belong to their external
identity, but of other, presumably imaginary people. The Iraquis have
been sent back Iraq. In this example, the relationship between inter-
nal and external identities is interesting: the Minister concerned (her
name is Verdonk, perhaps you have heard of her) managed to conclude
that the Iraquis were ‘counterfeit’ in the light of her Decree, in stead
of the other way around - which would have obliged her to repair the
Decree. (It must be mentioned that our supreme court has since (in
2006) embraced the latter view.)
Child Porn in Second Life. My second example concerns child porn in second
life. As you all know, Second Life is some sort of virtual stage where
you can create characters (which are called ‘Avatars’), dress them up
and make them move and communicate. Some sick minds make mature
and childlike Avatars and make them join in sexual acts in Second Life.
Do these Avatars have internal identity? Do these Avatars belong to the ex-
ternal identities of the individuals that made or make their own Avatars ‘play’
with them? Can their actions be understood, investigated and prosecuted
as child porn? What if the ‘owners’ of the Avatars are children themselves?
These are serious legal questions, especially if our legal intuition tells us
that this type of behaviour should be considered criminal and (some of) our
contingent legal systems do not have adequately defined appropriate criminal
acts. The example shows that how we interpret external identities and whose
resposibility they are to be of serious legal concern.
An entry in wikipedia. My third example concerns Wikipedia. Let me quote a
message from the local Dutch Reuters, the ANP - and yes, I am almost
embarrassed to be Dutch:
“THE HAGUE, November 17 - Approximately 30.000 civil ser-
vants, subservient to the Dutch Minister of Justice have been
forbidden to surf to the digital Internet encyclopedia Wikipedia.
Thus has been confirmed by a spokesman of the Department.
Jokes and offensive changes introduced into Wikipedia by civil
i
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servants, using their workstations at the Department caused the
ban.”
The example shows several things. First, that external identities may be used
to vandalize serious collaborative services. Second, that it is more difficult to
hide one’s IP-address than some people apparently thought. Third, that the
actions of subordinates were interpreted as being so harmful to the external
identity of the Dutch Minister of Justice, that he took serious and generic
action. And, finally, that at least some Dutch civil servants tend to Internet
vandalism for fun.
As you will know, Wikipedia is a social phenomenon of very open and
liberal nature. It almost completely rests on the vigilance of its community to
guard and keep its quality and worth. It also gets in trouble through attacks
by Internet users who do not comply with its policy, either aiming for cheap
advertisements or just for ‘the fun of it.’ It is interesting that community
commitment and community vigilance may suffice as a defence mechanism.
Up till now, it has managed. It is to be feared, however, that, as soon as the
intensity of attacks grows, these defence mechanisms will lose the battle.
A target for advertisements. My fourth example concerns automatic profiling
of your Internet search behaviour by Google and the related, focused
targeting of internet ads.
Here, a part of your external identity is automatically created and used. The
interesting thing here is that you have to curb your Internet search behaviour
to influence your profile, while you not even know how these profiles are made.
A credit card owner in the USA. My fifth example concerns a personal expe-
rience in the USA. I brought my credit card, as that is the way things
are payed over there. I was roaming the country from one appointment
to another and had to find a hotel in Newport for one night. I made a
reservation by phone and wondered why the reservation had apparently
not been processed as the Hotel didn’t expect me. Anyway, they had
a room and all seemed well. However, a few days later, my creditcard
i
i
“Ankara” — 2008/1/11 — 17:02 — page 12 — #12 i
i
i
i
i
i
12 2 A few examples
was no longer accepted anywhere and I was sure that this could not be
due to lack of funds. I was with a friend and managed - but I could
not easily repair my Amarican credit (as a first attempt lead to an ad-
ministrative quigmire). And, as my only American dealings concerned
Amazon.com (who did no longer accept my card either) I let things
rest. Until two hotel bookings on the same night of a Holiday Inn hotel
in two different Newports emerged. While making my reservation, I
had underestimated the number of cities called Newport in the USA
and had apparently slept in one and reserved in another.
What is interesting here, is that one mistaken hotel booking in the USA
may suffice for your credit to be blocked without further notice and without
an easy procedure for repair. Dealing in the USA may be dangerous to the
health of your external, credit-card related identity.
2.1 A taxonomy of identity problems
So far my examples. Let me now try to sketch a taxonomy of possible
internal-external identity anomalies. There are three possibilities: (1) the
anomaly is positive, that is, the external identity overestimates inherent
value; (2) the anomaly is negative, underestimating te inherent value and
(3) the anomaly is complete, that is, the external identity does not refer to
anything with inherent value at all.
(8) Identity anomalies are value-related and positive, negative or complete
Thus, identity anomalies are context dependent. Let us first look at a simple
case regarding the objects on offer via an internet service, say eBay - focusing
on sales-relationships and direct pricing effects:
Anomaly Author Winner Loser
Positive Seller Seller Buyer
Negative Survey Buyer Seller
Detached Fraud Fraud Buyer & eBay
i
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2.1 A taxonomy of identity problems 13
To show that in a different context there are differences in winners and losers,
let us look at two more tabels. First we focus on credit relationships:
Anomaly Author Winner Loser
Positive ? Client, Seller Bank
Negative Hotel - Client, Seller & Bank
Detached Fraud Fraud Client & Bank
and, lastly we focus on stock value and the Enron case:
Anomaly Author Winner Loser
Positive CEO Stockholders & Enron -
Negative Consultant - Sockholders & Enron
Detached Fraud Fraud Stockholders & Enron
I want to point out three issues, that show in these tables.
First, when we consider external identities to lead up to something like
reputation, it is easy to imagine contributions to it by parties that have no
relationship to the objects or individuals the reputation is about. I had no
contract whatsoever with the hotel in the USA, allowing it to infringe my
external identity concerning credit. In this sense, legal issues on identity
anomalies are not of pure private law character.
Second, it seems to me that positive and negative anomalies are the types
of failures, we have to live with in real life all the time. Lets be honest re-
garding reputations, they are almost never completely right. There is a big
difference, though, between positive and negative anomalies on the one hand,
and complete anomalies on the other. Complete anomalies, if created with
intent, intuitively belong to the realm of criminal law, while many issues
concerning the other anomalies may be appropriate for private and/or ad-
ministrative regulation and may be left to play their roles in markets and
administrations.
Third, as identity anomalies induce risk, we want to manage them. In this
sense, identity management equals striving to keep down positive, negative
and complete failures.
i
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14 3 A last example
3 A last example
But how? Here we turn back to our institutional-game approach and, again,
use an example.
Second Life is a virtual world, with virtual dollars, called Linden dollars.
Sometimes, these dollars get stolen. It has happened. One interesting aspect
of these Linden dollars is, that they have real value, in the sense that they
can be converted into real dollars. Thus, fraud with Linden dollars translates
to fraud with the equivalent monetary value - even may lead to deminishing
the ‘currency’ of the Linden dollar in general. This leads to the following
question:
(9) Are Linden dollars equivalent to dollars?
Our general legal intuition seems to be that stealing Linden dollars in Sec-
ond Life is a criminal act. There have been scholarly articles, urging our
legislators to bring Second Life banking under general banking law - which is
currently not possible, as Second Life banks are no financial service providers
in the banking law sense whatsoever. Banking and ‘Second Life banking’ are
different institutional games. And the main difference is in the external
identities or reputations of dollars and Linden dollars. Maintaining the rep-
utation of dollars has become a public affair, at least in part, supported by
administrative and criminal laws. The reputation of Linden dollars is in a
different ballpark. Linden dollars are for fun - even if fun sometimes turns
serious. We should understand the risks involved. And we should respect
its potential for the development of innovative services in laboratory condi-
tions, still free of administrative licensing and control. If anywhere at all,
new mechanisms and procedures for keeping identity-anomalies under con-
trol will be developed and tested in virtual institutional games like Second
Life.
When we remember that our information society is still in its infancy,
the most important conlusion my analysis leads up to is simply this: we
need room for learning by doing, also for internet banking, and internet
services can privide this room, as long as we refrain from fencing them in, in
traditional legal constraints we declare applicable prematurely.
i
i
“Ankara” — 2008/1/11 — 17:02 — page 15 — #15 i
i
i
i
i
i
15
4 Conclusions for Internet Banking
This brings me to my concluding remarks. Identities are inherent to ob-
jects, persons, companies and communities. Their external identities serve
as (amongst other legal trivia like evidence) their reputations, as derived
from administrative representations of identity behaviour. External identi-
ties have meaning in the context of institutional games. External identities
are, looking e.g., at Google,8 becoming the commodities for a whole new
industry, focusing on identity management.
As a matter of fact, the banking industry is dependent on identity man-
agement. As its services are also of public importance, traditional legal
arrangements for essential issues here have been put in place for some time
now. These arrangements are presumably beneficiary, but they also reduce
leeway for innovation, and neither are they without problems (as discussed
elsewhere in this conference; the focus in material-law issues seems currently
on asymmetric banking-services contracts and on due diligence concerning te
anticipation of evidentiary good practices). My focus lies elsewhere, however.
Institutional games thrive by participant commitment - Internet services
have shown us at least that. Security measures may interfere with participant
commitment. There is a balance to be struck. Information technology may
support the optimum; it may also support over-, as it may support under-
protection. In this, we may investigate and learn from the track records of
successful Internet services like Google, eBay, Wikipadia, Second Life, Hyves,
YouTube, the “Peer-to-Patent” initiative and what not.9 We may try to find
methods that adequately support the right security-commitment equilibrium
for Internet banking.
Virtual financial services outside the thoroughly regulated Banking sector
may prove beneficiary to it from the innovation perspective. It may be worth
while for banks to watch what is happening on that front (and to explore the
8 Echelon-like enterprises by intelligence organisations and trusted third parties in
eCommerce are other examples.
9 See for an interesting discussion of democratic government in this vein: Beth Si-
mone Noveck, Wiki-Government. Democracy, winter 2008:7 〈URL: http://www.
democracyjournal.org/printfriendly.php?ID=6570〉
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available space for laboratory experiments themselves).
~
5 Appendix: A few background postulates accounted
for
In this, I use ‘law science’ to distinguish from mainstream legal scholarship,‘Law
sciences’ which is mainly concerned with interpretation of material laws in individ-
ual cases, often evaluating material laws against constitutional and (inter-
national) human rights legislation. I consider mainstream legal scholarship
to be positivist inclined in its focus on promulgated rules. My need for ‘law
science’ stems from the assumption that regulation also is an inescapable,
natural result of organization, while organization is inescapable when life gets
more complex, as it all the time does.
I adopt a special approach to ’law science’, harvested by analogy from
economics and medicine. Like economics (with its invisible hand working
towards welfare) and medicine (considering health a natural state), I assume
a ‘natural, invisible moral hand’ to be simply there, working our societies to-
wards the optimums that express themselves in optimal rule-of-lawness when
nursed appropriately. In economics, like in medicine, failures tend to stare
one in the face. So do rule-of-law failures. Basically, I am looking for causes
and remedies for rule-of-law failures of the self-evident kind, and will not
focus on what the optimum rule of law might be. Adopting this perspectiveScientific
relevance not only allows considering freedom to be part of natural optimums, it also
allows for descriptively framing research results, independent of contingent
legal systems and thus allows for a Popperian approach,10 contributing to
the growth of knowledge about rule-of-law failures, their causes and their
remedies.
Moreover, it suggests that a Dutch law professor may discuss some of his
ideas on Identity, Identity Management and some basic problems in Internet
10 Karl.R. Popper, Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge.
Routledge, 1963
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banking with a Turkish audience.
My main background conceptual vehicle in this is the Rule of Law. As
the rule of law shows itself in different guises over time, within and across Basic
conceptu-
alization
law systems, I aim for a generic rule-of-law conceptualization. I assume that
“the rule of law” refers not to a thing, but to an inherent quality of law sys-
tems.11 I thus acknowledge rule-of-law research to be in need of law-science
contributions of the kind Ulen whishes for,12 that is: of an international law
science, based on and growing with Popper’s mechanism of conjectures and
refutations.
My approach is ambitious in aiming for steps forward in such a law sci-
ence, it is an exercise in modesty in accepting that there are no complete
answers. I aim for modest, incremental steps in an ambitious direction.
My approach further assumes the following. Rule-of-lawness is a theo-
retical concept that presupposes some sort of reciprocity between levels of
government/organization. Generalizing Coase’s point concerning the emer-
gence of firms13 in the face of the free market, I embrace the contention that
organization may conditionally prove more valuable than unorganized free
exchange. And that any law system strikes a dynamic equilibrium of the
‘costs’ of reduced freedoms and the ‘benifits’ of organized governance. The
equilibrium is value-based and provides legitimacy to rule-of-law equilibri-
ums. It is assumed that economic values are inherently under-specific14 for
understanding rule-of-law equilibriums. And: as an expression of value equi-
libriums, the rule-of-lawness of law systems can go wrong both ways: either
towards dictatorship, where hierarchy ousts individual freedoms, or towards
11 See, e.g., Fuller (as in n. 2), Brian Z. Tamanaha, On the Rule of Law. Oxford University
Press, 2004, HiiL, Rule of Law Inventory Report - Academic Part. 2007 – Technical report
〈URL: http://www.hiil.org/uploads/File/1-947-Rule_of_Law_Inventory_Report_
2007.pdf〉, ?, ; Benjamin R. Barber, Fear’s Empire: War, Terrorism and Democracy.
W.W. Norton & Company, 2003; Ellickson (as in n. 2); Avner Greif; Claude Ménard and
Mary M. Shirley, editors, Chap. 28 - Commitment, Coercion and Markets: The Nature
and Dynamics of Institutions Supporting Exchange In Handbook of New Institutional
Economics. Springer, 2005; Werner F. Mensky, Comparative law in a global context: The
legal systems of Asia and Africa. Platinum, 2000
12 Ulen (as in n. 4)
13 Coase (as in n. 2)
14 See, e.g., Frey (as in n. 2).
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18 5 Appendix: A few background postulates accounted for
anarchy, where individual freedoms oust hierarchical leadership. My working
hypotheses are these:
(i) Fuller’s eight moralities of duty (being widely accepted as such)Working
hypotheses provide the ‘lean’ core definition of rule of law.
(ii) Any law system’s sustainability/stability relies on its legitimacy
and the power equilibriums between its endogenous elites.15
(iii) Any law system’s legitimacy relies on value equilibriums across
and within its hierarchical levels.16
(iv) Institutions17 are cultural systems of individuals, ‘demilitarizedInstitutions
zones’18 and organizations (with collective interests and a do-
main19 where these interests are protected and nursed) that gen-
erate generalities in behaviour by cultivating rules, policies, norms
15 In my approach I opt for the minimal combination of (1) a reciprocity-based concept
of legitimacy (see for instance: Olson (as in n. 2)) and (2) an organizational equilibrium
between executive, legislative and judiciary powers (see for instance: de Secondat (Mon-
tesquieu) (as in n. 2)).
16 In aim for modeling and measuring financial and non-financial administration-civilian
value equilibriums (see for instance: A.H.J. Schmidt; Jeroen Donkers et al., editors, Chap.
Ought Computers Adjudicate? In Liber Amicorum Jaap H. van den Herik. MICC,
Universiteit Maastricht, 2007 〈URL: http://www.cs.unimaas.nl/jaap60/papers/B20_
schmidt.pdf〉, p. 135-137).
17 I consider ‘institution’ a kernel concept of my research approach and expect its meaning
to be closer to a ‘natural’ social structure resulting from the necessity to organize, specialize
and delegate (as used in ‘New Institutional Economics’), than to the formerly popular focal
concept of many rule-of-law implementation or -transplantation ambitions.
18 In my understanding of institutions, they not only can take part in exchanges with
others, they also have to provide local spaces for exchange (or: demilitarized zones). From
an economic perspective these spaces are reciprocity-based, price-forming markets (see, for
instance, Douglass North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance.
Cambridge University Press, 1990). I adopt the other terminology because not all ex-
changes are for money and the concept of ‘market’ and its corollaries with it, tends to
be transplanted all too easily to non-economic perspectives. Other values may even be
crowded out when expressed in currency (see: Frey (as in n. 2)).
19 I consider the ‘domain-of-jurisdiction’ and ‘scope-of-jurisdiction’ concepts character-
istic to institutions. During the institutional setting of a football game, for example, on
the pitch, forms of behavior are considered as perfectly acceptable which in everyday life
would result in arrest and conviction. The conceptualization of institutional domain and
-scope, defining the jurisdictional boundaries of institutions is a tool for addressing ques-
tions related to the issues of multilevel jurisdictions and the proliferation of jurisdictions.
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and beliefs through internal and external feedback transactions.20
Organizations in institutions may be institutions themselves. Thus,Multilevel
themeinstitutions are often embedded in institutional networks. As
such, institutions will often show multilevel jurisdiction.
(v) Any21 institution is (structurally) a law system and can be valu-
ated for rule-of-lawness.22
(vi) As institutional analysis assumes generalities of social behaviour
to be motivated by collective beliefs,23 feedback techniques, con-
necting communication with collective beliefs are an important
issue. I assume that results in media- and communication re-
search24 are significant input for our analyses.
Because the Rule of Law concept is important in my approach, it may be
appropriate to provide some further circumscription of how I see it. The
concept is central to public international law, where people are looking des-
perately for legal instruments that may help further world peace and world
prosperity - yes, ambitions are high. In this scene, it is considered a received
postulate that the Rule of Law will help to achieve these things, which - as
20 Based on Aernout Schmidt, Wilfred Dolfsma and Wim Keuvelaar, Fighting the War
on File Sharing. T.M.C. Asser Press, 2007, p. 160, which is based on Greif, Institutions
and the Path to the Modern Economy: Lessons from Medieval Trade (as in n. 1).
21 Cf. Fuller (as in n. 2), p. 124-127.
22 For conceptualisation of these valuations, we follow the analytical lead of Douglas
(Mary Douglas, Natural Symbols: Explorations in Cosmology. Penguin Books, 1978). I
adapt Douglas’ group-grid framework into a grid-materialist framework for distinguish-
ing value types for the freedom-governance value equilibriums expressing any institution’s
rule-of-lawness. I identify four prototypical specialized organizations that are conditionally
preferred over unorganized individual exchange: families (low grid) for the organization
for individual values like autonomy, firms (high materialist) for the organisation for profit,
foundations (low materialist) for the organization for ideals/beliefs and forces (high grid)
for the organization for public order and security (see also: Schmidt, Dolfsma and Keu-
velaar (as in n. 20), p. 156-157). In the evaluation of rule-of-lawness, all four value types
are combined.
23 Greif, Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy: Lessons from Medieval Trade
(as in n. 1)
24 See for instance Todd Gitlin, The Whole World is Watching: Mass Media in the
Making and Unmaking of the Left. Univeristy of California Press, 1980 and Stanley Cohen,
Folk devils and moral panics. MacGibbon and Kee, 1972.
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a natural result of continuous failure - leads up to confusion and apparent
unending discussions on what the concept may mean.25 Generally, in the
Western world, two types are distinguished: a ‘lean’ and a ‘material’ concept
of Rule of Law. The lean concept coincides largely with the eight moralities
of duty as presented by Fuller26 and the material concept of rule-of-lawness is
constructed by extending the lean one with additionally requiring the basic
set of human rights to be operational. Essentially, the Rule of Law is not a
thing, but a quality, it is a reference to that minimal quality of law systems
that legitimates the powers of enforcement within.27 The foregoing analysis
is written against the background of the postulates mentioned. I consider
it especially appropriate in situations where legal analysis is required con-
cerning new phenomena, where material law has not yet found its feet. This
seems often the case where internet services are brought to the fore. As
such, the approach - although meant to be a scientific one - might be of some
use even for legal practice, as it is often the first to be confronted with new
Internet-related situations, not yet fit for run-of-the-mill interpretation.
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